Threshold Learning Dynamics in Social Networks by González-Avella, Juan Carlos et al.
Threshold Learning Dynamics in Social Networks
Juan Carlos Gonza´lez-Avella1*, Victor M. Eguı´luz1, Matteo Marsili2, Fernado Vega-Redondo3,4, Maxi San
Miguel1
1 Instituto de Fı´sica Interdisciplinar y Sistemas Complejos IFISC (CSIC-UIB), Palma de Mallorca, Spain, 2 The Abdus Salam International Centre for Theoretical Physics,
Trieste, Italy, 3 European University Institute, Florence, Italy, 4 Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Econo´micas, Valencia, Spain
Abstract
Social learning is defined as the ability of a population to aggregate information, a process which must crucially depend on
the mechanisms of social interaction. Consumers choosing which product to buy, or voters deciding which option to take
with respect to an important issue, typically confront external signals to the information gathered from their contacts.
Economic models typically predict that correct social learning occurs in large populations unless some individuals display
unbounded influence. We challenge this conclusion by showing that an intuitive threshold process of individual adjustment
does not always lead to such social learning. We find, specifically, that three generic regimes exist separated by sharp
discontinuous transitions. And only in one of them, where the threshold is within a suitable intermediate range, the
population learns the correct information. In the other two, where the threshold is either too high or too low, the system
either freezes or enters into persistent flux, respectively. These regimes are generally observed in different social networks
(both complex or regular), but limited interaction is found to promote correct learning by enlarging the parameter region
where it occurs.
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Introduction
Social learning has been a topic of central concern in economics
during the last decades [1], as it is central to a wide range of socio-
economic phenomena. Consumers who want to choose among a
given set of available products may seek the opinion of people they
trust, in addition to the information they gather from prices and/or
advertisement. And voters who have to decide what candidate to
support in an election, or citizens who have to take a stand on some
issue of social relevance may rely on their contacts to form their
opinion. Ultimately, whether our societies take the right course of
action on any given issue (e.g. on climate change) will hinge upon
our ability to aggregate individual information that is largely
disperse. Thus, in particular, it must depend on the information
diffusion mechanism by which agents learn from each other, and
therefore on the underlying social network in which they are
embedded. The significance of the conceptual challenges raised by
these issues is made even more compelling by the booming advance
in Information and Communication Technologies, with its impact
on the patterns of influence and communication, and on the way
and speed in which we communicate.
These key issues have attracted the interest of researchers in
several fields. For example, the celebrated ‘‘voter model’’ [2,3] is a
prototype of those simple mechanistic models that are very
parsimonious in the description of individual behavior but allow
for a full characterization of the collective behavior induced. The
voter model embodies a situation where each agent switches to the
opinion/state held by one of the randomly selected neighbors at
some given rate, and raises the question of whether the population
is able to reach consensus, i.e. a situation where all agents display
the same state. The literature on consensus formation, as reviewed
e.g. in Refs. [4,5], has focused, in particular, on the role played by
the structure of the underlying network in shaping the asymptotic
behavior. One of the main insights is that the higher the effective
dimensionality of the network, the harder it is to obtain conformity
[6,7]. Consensus formation in social systems is closely related to
the phenomenon of social learning. Indeed, the latter can be
regarded as a particular case of the former, when consensus is
reached on some ‘‘true’’ (or objective) state of the world, for
example, given by an external signal [8,9] impinging on the social
dynamics.
At the opposite end of the spectrum, economists have stressed
the micro-motives that underlie individual behavior and the
assumption of rationality. They have also emphasized the
importance of going beyond models of global interaction and/or
bilateral random matching, accounting for some local structure
(modeled as a social network) in the pattern of influence or
communication among agents. This literature (see Ref. [10] for an
early survey) has considered a number of quite different scenarios,
ranging from those where agents just gather and refine
information [11–13] to contexts where, in addition, there is
genuine strategic interaction among agents [14]. Despite the wide
range of specific models considered, the literature largely conveys
a striking conclusion: full social conformity is attained (although
not necessarily correct learning), irrespectively of the network
architecture. On the other hand, to attain correct learning, one
must require not only that the population be large but, in the limit,
that no individual retain too much influence [14,15].
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The model studied in this paper displays some similarities to, as
well as crucial differences with, those outlined above. To fix ideas,
the model could be regarded as reflecting a situation where,
despite the fact that new information keeps arriving throughout,
the consequences of any decision can only be observed in the
future. As a more concrete example, this could apply to the
performance of a political candidate, the health consequences of
consuming a particular good, or the severity of the problem of
climate change, on all of which a flow of fresh information may be
generated that is largely independent of agents’ evolving position
on the issue. So, as in Ref. [9], the agents receive an external
signal; however, the signal is noisy and it is confronted with the
behavior displayed by neighbors. As in Refs. [12,14], while the
agents make and adjust their choices, they keep receiving noisy
signals on what is the best action. In contrast, however, these
signals are not associated to experimentation. In this respect, we
share with Ref. [13,15] the assumption that agents’ arrival of
information is not tailored to current choices.
The problem, of course, would become trivially uninteresting if
agents either had unbounded memory or stored information that
is a sufficient statistic of the whole past (e.g. updated beliefs in a
Bayesian setup). In this case, agents could eventually learn the best
action by relying on their own information alone. Therefore we
make the stylized assumption that the particular action currently
adopted by each individual is the only ‘‘trace’’ she (and others)
keep of her past experience. Thus her ensuing behavior can only
be affected by the signal she receives and the range of behavior she
observes (i.e., her own as well as her neighbors’). Under these
conditions, it is natural to posit that if an agent receives a signal
that suggests changing her current action, she will look for
evidence supporting this change in the behavior she observes on
the part of her neighbors. And then, only if a sufficiently large
fraction of these are adopting the alternative action, she will
undertake the change. This, indeed, is the specific formulation of
individual learning studied in the present paper, which is in the
spirit of the many threshold models studied in the literature, such
as Refs. [16–20]. This formulation can be conceived as the
outcome of a situation where agents use Bayes rule to update their
actions rather than their beliefs, and have no memory of the past
(see Methods). The confidence they have on their current choice
(as embodied by their subjective probability that they are right), as
well as the corresponding confidence they attach to the signals and
and neighbors’ choices are taken as fixed parameters. Then,
essentially, what is required for an agent to follow a threshold rule
as described is that she attaches a high confidence to both her
current choice and her current signal. For, under these conditions,
when the signal and the choice point in opposite directions – and
only then – any change of behavior will hinge upon sufficient
strong support for it provided by the neighbors’ actions.
In the setup outlined, it is intuitive that the ‘‘acceptance
threshold’’ that agents require to abandon the status quo should
play a key role in the overall dynamics. And, indeed, we find that
its effect is very sharp. First, note the obvious fact that if the
threshold is either very high or very low, social learning (or even
behavioral convergence) cannot possibly occur. For, in the first
case (a very high threshold), the initial social configuration must
remain frozen, while in the second case (a very low threshold), the
social process would enter into a state of persistent flux where
agents keep changing their actions. In both of these polar
situations, therefore, the fraction of agents choosing the good
action would center around the probability p with which the signal
favors that action.
Outside these two polar situations, there is always an
intermediate region where social learning does occur. Within this
region, learning emerges abruptly: there are upper and lower
bounds (dependent on p) such that, if the threshold lies within
these bounds, all agents learn to play the good action while no
learning at all occurs if the threshold is outside that range. Thus the
three aforementioned regions are separated by sharp boundaries.
A similar abruptness in learning arises as one considers changes in
p. In this case, there is a lower bound on p (which depends on the
threshold) such that, again, we have a binary situation (i.e., no
learning or a complete one) if the informativeness of the signal is
respectively below or above that bound. In a sense, these stark
conclusions highlight the importance of the social dimension in the
learning process. They show that, when matters/parameters are
‘‘right,’’ the process of social learning builds upon itself to produce
the sharp changes just outlined. The situation is reminiscent of the
‘‘tipping-point’’ behavior that has been widely studied for
epidemic phenomena and which, as it is well understood by
now, often characterize as well the transitions of complex dynamic
systems.
As it turns out, this same qualitative behavior is encountered in
a wide variety of different network contexts. To understand the
essential features at work, we start our analysis by studying the
simple case of a complete graph, where every agent is linked to any
other agent. This context allows one to get a clear theoretical grasp
of the phenomenon. In particular, it allows us to characterize
analytically the three different regimes of social learning indicated:
correct learning, frozen behavior, or persistent flux. We then show
that this characterization also provides a good qualitative
description of the situation when the interaction among agents is
mediated via a sparse complex network. We consider, in
particular, three paradigmatic classes of networks: regular two-
dimensional lattices, Poisson random networks, and Baraba´si-
Albert scale free networks. For all these cases, we conduct
numerical simulations and find a pattern analogous to the one
observed for the complete graph. The interesting additional
observation is that local interaction enlarges (in contrast to global
interaction) the region where social learning occurs. In fact, this
positive effect is mitigated as the average degree of the network
grows, suggesting a positive role for relatively limited/local
connectivity in furthering social learning.
The model
There is large population of agents, N~f1,2,:::,Ng, placed on
a given undirected network C~(N,L), where we write ij [L if
there is link between nodes i and j in C. Let update step
s~0,1,2,::: be indexed discretely. Each agent i[N displays, at any
step s, one of two alternative actions ai(s)~+1, which are not
equivalent. One of them, say action 1, induces a higher (expected)
payoff, but the agents do not know this.
At each step s, one randomly chosen agent i[N receives a
signal on the relative payoff of the two actions. This signal, which
is independent across time and agents, is only partially
informative. Specifically, it provides the correct information (i.e.,
‘‘action 1 is best’’) with probability pw1=2, while it delivers the
opposite information with the complementary probability 1{p.
If agent i’s previous action ai(s{1) does not coincide with the
action ai(s) suggested as best, she considers whether changing to
the latter. We assume that she chooses ai(s) (thus making
ai(s)~ai(s)) if, and only if, the fraction of neighbors in
N i: j [N : ij [Lf g who chose ai(s) at s{1 exceeds a certain
threshold. Let this (common) threshold be denoted by t[ 0,1½ .
At the start of the dynamic process, each agent receives one
signal ai(0) and adopts the corresponding action. In other words,
the initial condition for the process is one where each agent,
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independently, holds action z1 with probability p or action {1
with probability 1{p.
The central question posed in the paper can now be precisely
formulated:
What is the relationship between p (the quality of the signal) and
t (the threshold for action change) that underlies the spread and
consolidation of action 1?
This is the question addressed in what follows, in a range of
different setups and relying on a variety of methodologies.
Results
Global interaction for infinite populations
Let us consider the case where interaction is global: for each
pair of agents i,j we have that i[N j and j [N i. Let x(t)[0,1
stand for the fraction of agents choosing action 1 at time
t~s=N. Setting the time in this way, for each agent the average
number of updates per unit of time is 1, irrespective of system
size N . In the limit of infinite population size (N??), the
dynamics is given by:
_x~{(1{p)xh(1{x{t)zp(1{x)h(x{t) ð1Þ
where h(z)~1 if z§0 while h(z)~0 if zv0. This equation is
derived by considering the change dx in the fraction x occurring
in a time interval of dt time steps (equivalently, Ndt updates). For
N??, for any finite dt, this increment converges, by the law of
large numbers, to a constant given by the right hand side of Eq. (1)
times dt. The first term accounts for the number of agents initially
with the right signal (x) who receive the wrong signal (with
probability 1{p) and adopt it, as the fraction of agents also
adopting it is larger than the threshold (1{xwt). The second
accounts for the opposite subprocess, whereby agents who receive
the correct signal (with probability p) switch to the correct action
when the population supports it (xwt).
We assume that, at time t~0, each agent receives a signal ai(0)
and adopts the corresponding action ai(0)~ai(0). Hence the
initial condition for the dynamics above is x(0)~p.
It is useful to divide the analysis into two cases:
Case I. t.1/2
In this case, it is straightforward to check that
xv1{t [ _x~{(1{p)xv0
1{tvxvt [ _x~0
xwt [ _x~p(1{x)w0
So, it follows that correct social learning, in which the whole
population adopts the action privileged by the signal
(x?~x(t??)~1), occurs iff pwt.
Case II. t,1/2
In this case, we find:
xvt [ _x~{(1{p)xv0
tvxv1{t [ _x~p{x
xw1{t [ _x~p(1{x)w0
And, therefore, correct social learning occurs iff pw1{t.
Combining both cases, we can simply state that, in the global
interaction case, correct social learning occurs iff,
t[ (1{p,p), ð2Þ
that is, the threshold t is within an intermediate region whose
size grows with the probability p, which captures the informative-
ness of the signal. However, there are other two phases: if
t[ (0,1{p), the system reaches the stationary solution x?~p;
while if t[ (p,1), we have _x~0 for all times, which means that the
system stays in the initial condition x?~x(t~0)~p.
It should be noted that the frozen solution x?~x(t~0)~p
only exists rigourously for the step-wise threshold function used in
our model. In a model with a blurred threshold in which h(z) is
replaced in equation (1), for example, by f (z)~½1z tanh (az)=2,
then _x=0 in the interval 1{tvxvt, and there is complete
learning for t[ (p,1). However, for reasonable large values of the
parameter a for which the threshold concept is still meaningful, the
dynamical flux is so small that the asymptotic learning solution is
only reached numerically on extremely long time scales. In fact, in
the numerical simulations described below for discrete systems
with a large population, only the frozen solution x?~x(t~0)~p
is observed for the whole duration of the simulations, even when
smoothing out the threshold function.
Numerical simulations
Now we explore whether the insights obtained from the infinite
size limit of the global interaction case carry over to setups with a
finite but large population, where agents are connected through a
social network.
First, we consider the benchmark case of global interaction (i.e.,
a completely connected network). Then, we turn to the case of
local interaction and focus on three paradigmatic network setups:
lattice networks, Erdo¨s-Re´nyi (Poisson) networks, and Baraba´si-
Albert (scale-free) networks [21].
Global interaction
The results obtained on the completely connected network (i.e.,
the network where every pair of nodes is linked) are in line with the
theory presented in the previous section. The essential conclusions
can be summarized through the phase diagram in the (p,t)-space
of parameters depicted in Figure 1. There we represent the
fraction of agents choosing action 1 in the steady state for each
parameter configuration, with the red color standing for a
homogeneous situation with x~1 (i.e., all agents choosing action
1) while the blue color codes for a situation where x~0:5 and
therefore the two actions are equally present in the population.
Intermediate situations appear as a continuous color grading
between these two polar configurations.
We find that, depending on the quality of the external signal p
and the threshold t, the system reaches configurations where
either complete learning occurs (x~1) or not (x~p). Indeed, the
observed asymptotic behavior is exactly as predicted by the
analysis of the previous section and it displays the following three
phases:
N Phase I: tv1{p. The system reaches a stationary aggregate
configuration where the nodes are continuously changing their
state but the average fraction of those choosing action 1
gravitates around the frequency x~p, with some fluctuations
(see Figure 2 A). The magnitude of these fluctuations decreases
with system size N.
N Phase II: 1{pvtvp. The system reaches the absorbing state
x~1 where everyone adopts action 1. This is a situation where
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the whole population eventually learns that the correct choice
is action 1 (see Figure 2 B).
N Phase III: twp. The system freezes in the initial state, so the
fraction x~p of agents choosing the correct action coincides
with the fraction of those that received the corresponding
signal at the start of the process (see Figure 2 C).
It is worth noting that, while in Phase I the theory predicts
x~p, any finite-size system must eventually reach an absorbing
homogenous state due to fluctuations. Thus, to understand the
nature of the dynamics, we determine the average time tsv that
the system requires to reach such an absorbing state. As shown in
Figure 3, tsv grows exponentially with N . This means that tsv
grows very fast with system size, and thus the coexistence predicted
by the theory in Phase I can be regarded as a good account of the
situation even when N is just moderately large.
Lattice networks
Now assume that all nodes are placed on a regular boundariless
lattice of dimension 2, endowed with the distance function d(:)
given by d(i,j)~max Dxi{xj D,Dyi{yj D
 
. The social network is
then constructed by establishing a link between every pair of
agents lying at a lattice distance not larger than a pre-specified
level d. This defines the neighborhood N i of any agent i[N , as
given by N i~fj [N : d(j,i)ƒdg. In this network, the degree (i.e.
the number of neighbors) of any node ki~k is related to d ; for
instance, if d~1 we have k~8.
The behavior of the system is qualitatively similar to the case of
a fully connected network. Again we find three phases. In two of
them, both actions coexist with respective frequencies p and 1{p
(one phase is frozen and the other continuously fluctuating), while
in the other phase the whole population converges to action 1. A
global picture of the situation for the entire range of parameter
values is shown in Figure 4, with the black diagonal lines define the
boundaries of the full-convergence region under global interac-
tion. In comparison with the situation depicted in Figure 1, we
observe that the region in the (p,t)-space where behavioral
convergence obtains in the lattice network is broader than in the
completely connected network. This indicates that restricted (or
local) interaction facilitate social learning, in the sense of enlarging
the range of conditions under which the behavior of the
population converges to action 1.
As a useful complement to the previous discussion, Figure 5
illustrates the evolution of the spatial configuration for a typical
simulation of the model in a lattice network, with different values
of t and p~0:6. Panels a, b and c show the configurations of the
system for a low value of t~1=8 at three different time steps: t~0,
1000 and 2000 respectively. The evolution of the system displays a
configuration analogous to the initial condition, both actions
coexisting and evenly spreading throughout the network. This is a
situation that leads to dynamics of the sort encountered in Phase I
above. In contrast, Panels g, h and i correspond to a context with a
high t~7=8, which induces the same performance as in Phase III.
It is worth
emphasizing that although Panels a, b and c display a similar
spatial pattern, they reflect very different dynamics, i.e., contin-
uous turnover in the first case, while static (frozen initial
conditions) in the second case. Finally, Panels d , e and f illustrate
the dynamics for an intermediate value of t~1=2, which leads to a
behavior of the kind displayed in Phase II. Specifically, these panels
show that, as the system moves across the three time steps: t~0,
16 and 21, the system evolves, very quickly, toward a state where
all agents converge to action 1.
Erdo¨s-Re´nyi and scale-free networks
A lattice network is the simplest possible context where local
interaction can be studied. It is, in particular, a regular network
where every agent faces exactly symmetric conditions. It is
therefore interesting to explore whether any deviation from this
rigid framework can affect our former conclusions. This we do
here by focusing on two of the canonical models studied in the
network literature: the early model of Erdo¨s and Re´nyi (ER) [22]
and the more recent scale-free model introduced by Baraba´si and
Albert (BA) [23]. Both of them abandon the regularity displayed
by the lattice network and contemplate a non-degenerate
distribution of node degrees.
The ER random graph is characterized by a parameter m,
which is the connection probability of agents. It is assumed,
Figure 1. Phase diagram of the threshold model on a fully
connected network. The colors represent the fraction of agents
choosing action 1 (from red, x~1 to blue, x~0:5). System size given by
N~104 agents; averaged over 100 realizations.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0020207.g001
Figure 2. Typical realizations of the time evolution of the fraction of agents choosing action 1, x, in a fully connected network of
system size N~104 with p~0:60, and (A) t~0:20; (B) t~0:50; (C) t~0:80.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0020207.g002
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specifically, that each possible link is established in a stochastically
independent manner with probability m. Consequently, for any
given node, its degree distribution P:fP(k)g determining the
probability that its degree is k is Binomial, i.e.,
P(k)~
N{1
k
 
mk(1{m)N{1{k, with an expected degree given
by SkT~m(N{1). In the simulations reported below, we have
focused on networks with SkT~8 and N~104.
On the other hand, to build a BA network, we follow the
procedure described in Ref. [23]. At each step, a new node is
added to the network and establishes m links to existing nodes.
The newcomer selects its neighbors randomly, with the probability
of attaching to each of the existing nodes being proportional to
their degree k. It is well known that this procedure generates
networks whose degree distribution follows a power law of the
form P(k)^2m2k{c, with c&3. For our simulations, we have
constructed BA networks using this procedure and a value of
m~4, leading to an average degree SkT~2m~8.
The networks are constructed, therefore, so that they have the
same average degree in both the ER and BA contexts. It is
important to emphasize, however, that the degree distributions
obtained in each case are markedly different. While in the former
case, the degree distribution induces an exponentially decaying
Figure 3. The average survival time tsv in fully connected networks for different system sizes N for p~0:60 and t~0:20. The
continuous line corresponds to an exponential fit of the form tsv* exp(cN), being c a constant; averaged over 100 realizations.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0020207.g003
Figure 4. Phase diagram of the threshold model on a two-
dimensional lattice with k~8 (d~1). The colors represent the
fraction of agents choosing action 1 (from red, x~1, to blue, x~0:5).
System size N~104 ; average over 100 realizations.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0020207.g004
Figure 5. Time evolution of the threshold model on a two-
dimensional lattice with k~8 for different values of t and
p~0:60. Panels (A–C): t~ 1
8
and time steps (A) t~0, (B) 1000 and (C)
2000. Panels (D–F): t~ 1
2
and time steps (D) t~0, (E) 16 and (F) t3~21.
Panels (G–I): t~ 7
8
and time steps (G) t~0, (H) 1000 and (I) 2000. Black
color represents an agent using action{1, while white color represents
action 1. The system size is N~104 .
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0020207.g005
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probability for high-degree nodes, in the latter case it leads to ‘‘fat
tails’’, i.e. associates significant probability to high-degree nodes.
The results are illustrated in Figure 6. For the two alternative
network topologies, the system displays qualitatively the same
behavior found in the lattice network. That is, there are three
distinct phases yielding distinct kinds of dynamic performance:
convergence to action 1, frozen behavior, and persistent turnover.
However, it is interesting to note that, compared with the case of
global interaction, the convergence region (which we labeled as
Phase II before) is significantly larger. This suggests that local (i.e.
limited) connectivity facilitates social learning.
Why does limited connectivity extend the learning region?
Intuitively, the reason is that it enhances the positive role in
learning played by random fluctuations. Such fluctuations are
neglected, by construction, in the mean-field approximation and
are also minimized when the whole population interacts globally.
But, when interaction is local, those fluctuations will tend to de-
stabilize the situation in both the constant flux and in the frozen
phases – at first, locally, but then also globally.
To gain a more refined understanding of this issue, let us try to
assess the effect of local interaction on the likelihood that, at some
random initial conditions, any given node faces a set of neighbors
who favors a change of actions. This, of course, is just equal to the
probability that the fraction of neighbors who display opposite
behavior is higher than t, the required threshold for change. Thus,
more generally, we want to focus on the conditional distribution
densities wz(n) and w{(n) that specify, for an agent displaying
actions 1 and{1 respectively, the probability density of finding a
fraction n of neighbors who adopt actions{1 and 1, respectively.
Of course, these distributions must depend on the degree
distribution of the network and, in particular, on its average
degree. Specifically, when the average degree of the network is
large relative to population size (thus we approximate a situation of
global interaction) those distributions must be highly concentrated
around p and 1{p respectively. Instead, under lower connectivity
(and genuine local interaction), the distributions wz(n) and w{(n)
will tend to be quite disperse.
Next, let us understand what are the implications of each
situation. In the first case, when the connectivity is high, the
situation is essentially captured by a mean-field approximation,
and thus the induced dynamics must be well described by the
global interaction case (in particular, as it concerns the size of the
convergence region). In contrast, when the connectivity is low and
the distributions wz(n) and w{(n) are disperse, a significant
deviation from the mean-field theory is introduced. In fact, the
nature of this deviation is different depending on the level of the
threshold t. If it is low, and thus action turnover high, it mitigates
such turnover by increasing the probability that the fraction of
neighbors with opposite behavior lie below t. Instead, if t is high
and action change is difficult, it renders it easier by increasing the
probability that the fraction of neighbors with opposite behavior
lies above t. Thus, in both cases it works against the forces that
hamper social learning and thus improves the chances that it
occurs.
More precisely, the above considerations are illustrated in
Figure 7 for a lattice network. There we plot the distributions
wz(n) for different levels of connectivity k and parameter values
p~0:60 and t~0:30 – recall that these values correspond to
Phase I (with high turnover) in a fully connected network. Consider
first the situation that arises for values of k~8,24,56 – i.e. low
connectivity relative to the size of the system. Then we find that,
among the nodes that are adopting action 1, wz attributes a
significant probability mass to those agents whose fraction of
neighbors n choosing action{1 is below the threshold required to
change (as marked by the vertical dashed line). Such nodes,
therefore, will not change their action. And, as explained, this has
the beneficial effect of limiting the extent of action turnover as
compared with the global interaction setup. On the other hand,
the inset of Figure 7 shows that, among the nodes that are
adopting action {1, the distribution w{ associates a large
probability mass to those agents whose fraction of neighbors n
choosing the opposite action is above t. This ensures that there is a
large enough flow from action {1 to action 1. In conjunction,
these two considerations lead to a situation that allows, first, for
some limited nucleation around action 1 to take place, followed by
the ensuing spread of this action across the whole system
(Figure 7(B–D)).
Let us now reconsider the former line of reasoning when k is
large – in particular, take the case k~828 depicted in Figure 7.
Then, the corresponding distribution wz is highly concentrated
around n~p, essentially all its probability mass associated to values
that lie above t~0:30. This means that the induced dynamics
must be similar to that resulting from the complete-network setups,
and thus too-fast turnover in action choice prevents the attainment
of social learning. Clearly, social learning would also fail to occur
for such high value of k if the threshold t were large. In this case,
however, the problem would be that the highly concentrated
distributions wz and w{ would have most of their probability
mass lying below the threshold. This, in turn, would lead to the
A
B
Figure 6. Phase diagram of the threshold model in a (A) ER
network and in a (B) scale-free network with average degree
SkT~8. The colors represent the fraction of agents choosing action 1
(from red, x~1, to blue x~0:5). System size N~104 , average over 100
realizations.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0020207.g006
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freezing of the initial conditions, which again is the behavior
encountered for a complete network.
Discussion
The paper has studied a simple model of social learning with the
following features. Recurrently, agents receive an external
(informative) signal on the relative merits of two actions. And, in
that event, they switch to the action supported by the signal if, and
only if, they find support for it among their peers - specifically, iff
the fraction of these choosing that action lies above a certain
threshold. Given the quality of the signal, correct social learning
occurs iff the threshold is within some intermediate region, i.e.
neither too high nor too low. For, if it is too high, the situation
freezes at the configuration shaped at the beginning of the process;
and if it is too low, the social dynamics enters into a process of
continuous action turnover. A key conclusion is that social learning
is a dichotomic phenomenon, i.e. it either occurs completely or not
at all, depending on whether the threshold lies within or outside
the aforementioned region.
These same qualitative conclusions are obtained, analytically, in
the case of global interaction – which corresponds to a mean-field
version of the model – as well as, numerically, in a wide range of
social networks: complete graphs, regular lattices, Poisson random
networks, and Baraba´si-Albert scale-free networks. However, the
size of the parameter region where social learning occurs depends
on the pattern of social interaction. In general, learning is
enhanced (i.e. the size of the region enlarged) the less widespread is
such interaction. This happens because genuinely local interaction
favors a process of spatial nucleation and consolidation around the
correct action, which can then spread to the whole population.
In sum, a central point that transpires from our work is that,
in contrast to what most of the received socio-economic
literature suggests, social learning is hardly a forgone conclu-
sion. This, of course, is in line with the common wisdom that,
paraphrasing a usual phrase, crowds are not always wise. In our
threshold framework, this insight is robust to the topology or
density of social interaction. Furthermore, our results highlight
the importance of identifying the information diffusion mech-
anism, and the local sampling of the population provided by the
social network. But future research should explore whether it is
also robust to a number of important extensions. Just to mention
a few, these should include (a) interagent heterogeneity – e.g. in
their individual thresholds for change; (b) different behavioral
Figure 7. Influence of local connectivity in social learning (A). The initial probability density wz that a node using action 1 has a fraction n of
neighbor nodes with action {1, computed on a two-dimensional lattice for k~8, 24, 56, 828 and a completely connected network (from the
broadest to the narrowest probability density distribution). [Inset: wz (black, continuous) and w{ (red, dotted) for k~8.] Time evolution of the
probability densities wz (black) and w{ (red) in a two-dimensional lattice with k~56 for (B) t~0, (C) 5 and (D) 10. For all panels, the dashed line
indicates the threshold t~0:3; parameter values: system size is N~104 , p~0:60, and t~0:30.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0020207.g007
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rules – e.g. payoff-based imitation; or (c) the possibility that
agents adjust their links, so that learning co-evolves with the
social network.
Methods
Derivation of the threshold rule based on Bayesian
update
Consider a population of N agents and let X5V be the event
which agents are interested in predicting, which is a subset of the
sample space V.
The literature on Bayesian learning (see e.g. [24] and references
therein) discusses cases where a population exchanges their prior
information on X , and the key quantity is the log-likelihood ratio:
h(=)~ logPfX D=g
Pf X D=g , ð3Þ
where X~V=X is the complement of X and = is a given
information set. It is easy to show (see Ref. [24]) that when an
agent with information = receives information =’ (e.g. because he/
she exchanges information with another agent or receives a signal)
the log-likelihood ratio changes in an additive manner
h(=)?h(=|=’)~h(=)zh(=’): ð4Þ
Such a dynamics, after an infinite number of updates,
generically converge to a situation where h?+? corresponding
to the agent’s beliefs converging to certainty on whether X will
occur or not. Naı¨vely speaking, Bayesian learning describes a
dynamics under which individuals develop an ‘‘expertise’’ in the
subject matter and converge to a state of absolute certainty about
it.
This, however, seems implausible in cases where the subject
matter is extremely complex (e.g. climate change). Then
individuals are unlikely to become experts, rather they might hold
a particular opinion, and display a corresponding action, to which
they attach a given confidence. In this situation, if an agent
receives enough signals contrary to his/her current action (or
opinion) and enough of his/her neighbors also support the
opposite view, then that agent may change opinion. Social
learning then refers to the fact that the population as a whole may
converge to a consensus, even though individuals themselves have
beliefs which do not converge to certainty.
In order to model this setup, we assume from the outset that
agents attach a certain confidence to their opinion, to that of their
neighbors and to the signals they receive. Specifically, if X5V is
the event which agents are interested in predicting, we assume that
signals are random variables ai~0,1 with
P(ai~1DX )~P(ai~0D X )~pw1=2: ð5Þ
Agents, at any time, have their priors on X encoded in variables
ai~0,1, to which they attach a certain confidence p0w1=2, i.e.
P(X Dai)~p
ai
0 (1{p0)
1{ai : ð6Þ
In words, ai~1 means that i believes X will occur and ai~0
means he/she believes it will not, and p0 is the confidence they
have in such a belief.
The variable ai is observable by the nearest neighbors of i.
Reciprocally, i has access to the actions aj of his/her neighbors
which reveal their opinions. We assume that agents have
subjective beliefs on the correctness of the predictions of their
peers, i.e.
P(aj~1DX )~P(aj~0D X )~pnw1=2, j [Ni: ð7Þ
Here pn codifies the confidence which agents have on
neighbors’ opinions.
When news ai arrives, agent i will recompute the posterior
probability of X , given the new evidence. At that time he/she will
also look at neighbors and take their ‘‘opinion’’ into account. By
Bayes rule:
P X Dai,faj , j [Nig,ai
 
~
P(ai DX )Pj [Ni P(aj DX )
P(ai)Pj [Ni P(aj)
P(X Dai): ð8Þ
From this one can compute the likelihood ratio and conclude
that if
P X Dai,faj ,j [Nig,ai
 
P X Dai,faj ,j [Nig,ai
 w1, ð9Þ
then agent i will update ai?1. Otherwise he/she will set ai?0.
A simple calculation shows that, mathematically, this is equivalent
to
ai?a0i~
0 if 2ai{1zc0(2ai{1)zcn
P
j [Ni
(2aj{1)v0
1 if 2ai{1zc0(2ai{1)zcn
P
j [Ni
(2aj{1)§0
(
ð10Þ
with
c0~
p0(1{p)
p(1{p0)
,cn~
pn(1{p)
p(1{pn)
: ð11Þ
Now, the fact that agents change opinion only when they
receive a signal which is opposite to their opinion (i.e. when
ai~1{ai) and not when their neighbors change opinion, implies
that when ai~ai agents stick to their opinion. This requires
1zc0wkcn, ð12Þ
where k is the number of neighbors. On the other hand, when
ai=ai, in order to change opinion, agent i will need a fraction of
supporters of the new opinion ai which is larger than
f~
1
2
z
c0{1
kcn
, ð13Þ
as it can easily be argued from Eq. (10).
This implies that, fv1=2 describes a situation where agents
consider signals more informative than their own opinion (c0v1,
i.e. p0vp) whereas in general they consider the opinion of others
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less reliable than signals and than their own (see Eq. 12). Indeed
this analysis applies to the case where signals are nearly as
informative as one’s own opinion (c0&1) where cn*Dc0{1D%1.
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